| Emily K. Abel, PhD, MPH volved in an effort to expel Filipino immigrants, who were at first considered US "nationals."
Three agencies formulated public health policy in Los Angeles: the California State Board of Health, the Los Angeles City Health Department, and the Los Angeles County Department of Health, which was responsible for the unincorporated areas of the county as well as for several small cities within its borders. In addition, the Los Angeles County Department of Charities was involved in health as well as welfare because it operated both the county hospital and sanatorium; after 1932, its jurisdiction expanded to include most outpatient care delivered by the county. Although conflicts frequently arose among those 4 agencies, they generally agreed about the place Mexicans and Filipinos should occupy in Los Angeles.
Shortly after the completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869, Los Angeles launched a massive campaign to lure prospective residents. Promoters touted the opportunity to live in an exclusively White, AngloSaxon society as a major advantage. An 1894 editorial entitled "The Right Kind of People" that appeared in a prominent booster journal declared, "We are not compelled, as in most eastern cities, to set aside 20 to 30 per cent as speaking little or no English and caring nothing for American institutions. . . . Only the best class of immigration thus far has been attracted to this section, and the situation is likely to continue the same in the future." 4 But the desire for cheap labor shattered the dream of racial homogeneity. After 1914, when growers' demands for an inexpensive workforce coincided with unsettled economic and political conditions in Mexico, thousands of Mexicans poured into southern California. Their arrival provoked a fierce outcry from nativist groups, who argued that Mexicans created overwhelming social problems, took jobs away from Whites, and represented an undesirable racial group. As the Grizzly Bear, the journal of the Order of the Native Sons of the Golden West, wrote in 1927, "It is evident that, unless an end is put to the influx of Mexicans, this country will have merely substituted a low-grade Westerner for a European immigrant, with a new race problem thrown in. . . . The effect of this Mexican influx on the already over-burdened taxpayer should be considered. Los Angeles County . . . is the dumping ground for poverty-stricken Mexicans." This time, authorities were dealing not just with a virulent and frightening epidemic but with one that struck close to downtown, arousing fears that infection would spread to Whites and that bad publicity would undermine the tourist industry. Both city and state officials joined the campaign to eradicate the disease. They acted swiftly, establishing a quarantine over the affected areas, removing victims to the county hospital, disinfecting property, destroying buildings, and eradicating rodents. 13 As
William Deverell notes, public health reports highlighted the ethnicity of the patients and the "uncleanliness" of their neighborhoods.
14 Because tuberculosis was a major killer, it was the focus of sustained rather than episodic attention. By 1920, the city, the spread of disease" and "prevent neglect and carelessness in sanitation and hygiene"; their work therefore should not be regarded "in the nature of a charity." 7 To some extent, this comment simply reflected the scope of Pomeroy's charge. He was responsible for safeguarding population health, leaving the care of indigents to the Department of Charities. But Pomeroy also implied that Mexicans were outside the body politic and that their health was significant only insofar as it threatened that of Whites.
The following year, Pomeroy devoted the bulk of his report to attempts to extirpate typhus fever, which struck 4 Mexicans in a labor camp operated by the Southern Pacific Railroad in Harold, near Palmdale. Pomeroy acknowledged that the camp was "insanitary and overcrowded and proper facilities for bathing and general hygiene don't exist." Nevertheless, he considered Mexican workers to be masters of their own fates. "The Mexican was naturally uncleanly," his "habits tended to overcrowding," and "his ignorance and prejudice, coupled with a tendency to the life of a nomad, indeed created serious obstacles in the establishment of complete control." 8 Perhaps no event so clearly demonstrated the readiness of local officials to blame Mexicans for disease as the great influenza epidemic of 1918 to 1919, which killed more than 21 million peo-Public health officials helped to craft the anti-Mexican discourse and at the same time led efforts to segregate, exclude, and repatriate Mexican immigrants.
DANGEROUS AND BURDENSOME
In 1914, the newly established local health departments in Los Angeles confronted the overwhelming task of building a public health infrastructure for a burgeoning population spread over an enormous area. For several years, however, public health reports focused almost exclusively on the various infectious diseases associated with Mexican immigrants. In 1916, John L. Pomeroy, the director of the Los Angeles County Department of Health, explained why he needed to hire public health nurses by submitting the report of a temporary nurse who had worked in Irwindale, a "Mexican village of about 63 houses" between Covina and Azusa in the San Gabriel Valley. According to the nurse, "the secretive nature of the Mexican" made it difficult to obtain "accurate records"; nevertheless, it was clear that various infectious diseases were prevalent. The one case of syphilis demonstrated that "in the crowded condition of the homes, privacy is an impossibility, and the moral tone is low indeed." The "illicit sale of liquor" occurred constantly, tending "to demoralize these people even more than poverty and natural shiftlessness." "Proper supervision" of contagious diseases was especially important because "people refuse to go to a hospital for treatment." 6 In his letter to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors, Pomeroy stressed that public health nurses were needed to "protect the general public from 
EXCLUSION
The porousness of the border between Mexico and the United States was a critical concern to nativists. Health officials helped to aggravate that concern. Reporting on the 1916 typhus outbreak, Pomeroy predicted that more cases would develop not only because of the "unsettled conditions in Mexico" but also because "persons may slip through the border and get into the country without passing through the usual government quarantine stations." Until control was tightened, he would be compelled "to maintain strict regulations over the Mexican settlements throughout the county." 32 The following year, the federal government instituted more rigorous medical inspections at El Paso, the primary port of entry for Mexicans in the Southwest. Health authorities continued to 36 Two years later, she congratulated him "on the splendid fight that you have made so successfully on the quota" and indicated that she would be "glad" to "furnish any additional information." 37 Other officials testified in the hearings organized by Representative John C. Box of Texas on the bill to limit immigration from Mexico. Pomeroy, for example, stated, "Unless the tubercular and venereal Mexican is cared for through the public health department he is likely to become a public health problem of sufficient size to affect the general public health." 38 
MEXICAN REPATRIATION
The Great Depression had an especially devastating effect on Mexicans in Los Angeles. Although Mexicans were the first to lose jobs, many state and local relief efforts gave priority to Whites; some excluded noncitizens. 39 42 Although the department never again was able to transport so many people, it remained committed to a policy of expulsion throughout the decade. Department officials justified repatriation by pointing not just to the relief directed to Mexicans but also to the high cost of the health care services they received. On January 29, 1934, Rex Thomson, the superintendent of the department, wrote to Alejandro V. Martinez, the Mexican consul in Los Angeles, requesting his support for the repatriation campaign. "You will readily perceive," Thomson noted, "that the savings to the taxpayers due to the success of this repatriation has been tremendous." Those savings included not only the cost of the relief that would have been spent on the repatriates but also "the immense outstanding costs in the way of hospitalization, clinical and medical attention, and education facilities which this community is obligated to provide." 43 Thomson used virtually the same wording in a letter to the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors on February 14, asking for more funds for Mexican repatriation. 44 Abraham Hoffman writes that the repatriation program had "declined to the point where repatriates for the most part were . . . blind, tubercular, paralyzed, or were minor children or the aged." 52 The numbers involved certainly paled in comparison with those in earlier years, when trainloads of repatriates departed from Los Angeles. But these final trips also highlight a concern with the high cost of health care that had animated the campaign since its inception.
FILIPINO REPATRIATION
In 1932, the California State Board of Health wrote, "The exodus of thousands of Mexicans from this state has reduced both our clinic and hospital population with reference to this group." As a result, "Filipinos constitute one of our worst problems at the present time. Many of them are food handlers, either working in fields with fresh fruits or vegetables or working in kitchens and restaurants." 53 Because the Philippines was a US territory, the large numbers of Filipinos who arrived in California in the late 1920s were considered "nationals." By the early 1930s, Los Angeles had become an important center for that population.
As the Board of Health noted, many found employment in service work as well as in agriculture; a very high proportion were young, single men. 54 Pressure to expel Filipinos arose in the 1920s and intensified after the advent of the depression. As in the campaign for Mexican repatriation, an important charge was that many members of the population created social problems by importing "loathsome diseases" and requiring expensive medical care. 55 The nativists' first significant victory was the passage of the Tydings McDuffie Act in 1934, establishing the Philippines as a commonwealth and changing the status of Filipinos from nationals to aliens. 56 The 1935 Repatriation Act, introduced by California Congressman Robert Welch, provided for the return of "Filipino wards of public and private organizations" as well as others who were unemployed. 57 Although Welch originally had proposed that the War and Navy Departments furnish military transports, the government contracted with private steamship companies. 58 Very few Filipinos, however, accepted the offer of free transportation home.
59
Health officials helped to fuel the nativist campaign. As director of the State Bureau of Tuberculosis, Edythe Tate Thompson frequently traveled throughout the state to inspect its many public hospitals and sanatoriums. Her monthly reports, available for the period after 1933, document her relentless hostility toward Filipinos and her tireless efforts in  PUBLIC HEALTH THEN AND NOW  No accounts survive of conversations between Department of Charities staff and individual Mexican clients. Two cases that came to the attention of the Board of Supervisors, however, demonstrate the determination of staff to rid the county of clients with large medical expenses. In both, the department requested funds to return the families to Mexico by car rather than on the organized train trips. The first, occurring in August 1930, involved a woman and her 6 children. According to the letter from a department social worker, the family received $67.50 in county aid each month. In addition, "The children present numerous health problems which require costly medical care." Federal immigration authorities had refused the department's request to deport the family but promised that if the family "can be taken to TiaJuana the immigration officer will prevent their return." 46 The second case, 3 years later, involved a couple with 6 children. At a meeting of the State Board of Health 2 months later, she requested permission to raise the issue of the "deportation of aliens" with the California Conference of Social Agencies. 63 The resolution she submitted in May began by noting that more than 30 000 Filipinos lived in California and that tuberculosis was the cause of a third of their deaths.
In an explicit reference to the "likely to become a public charge" clause of the immigration statute, the resolution argued that the high prevalence of tuberculosis "constitutes dependency as these people must occupy beds in county hospitals and be cared for at public expense." The resolution concluded by recommending that California congressmen seek passage of the repatriation bill "and that it be stipulated that Army transports be used to return these unfortunate dependent people to their own country at the earliest possible moment." 64 The conference's refusal to vote on the resolution prompted Thompson to remark that social workers "seldom see the complications in the present social disorder."
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On a trip to Washington, DC, in August, Thompson met with the commissioner of immigration to urge him to work for "voluntary deportation" of Filipinos. As she later wrote, "I mentioned to him the great amount of sickness, particularly tuberculosis, among them at the present time; and the fact that they were filling up our hospital beds for almost indefinite periods; and I thought perhaps a recommendation from him to the War Department might make it possible to use these transports without legislation." 66 Again, she met opposi- 
DISCUSSION
With this article, I hope to expand understanding of the association of immigrants with dread diseases by focusing on Mexicans and Filipinos in Los Angeles during the early 20th century. At a time when Los Angeles elites were committed to establishing an exclusively Anglo-Saxon society, public health authorities may have assumed that they could make a convincing case for adequate resources only by promising to safeguard the health of the White majority. But if officials mirrored prevailing attitudes and responded to the particular context in which they operated, they also made their own contribution to the politics of exclusion. By establishing separate clinics for Mexicans and Whites, officials expanded patterns of segregation. And by exploiting White fears, officials may have helped to intensify them. Because public health authorities spoke with the voice of scientific authority, their portrayal of Mexicans as menaces carried special weight. 71 Health officials also added grist to the nativist mill when they portrayed Mexicans and Filipinos as economic burdens. Because both groups were assumed to be outsiders who had no entitlement to social provision, they were especially likely to be condemned when they took advantage of the limited medical services available to them. The argument that Mexicans and Filipinos made overwhelming demands on public health care services figured prominently in efforts to restrict their entry during the 1920s and expel them during the 1930s.
